Chicago-Kent College of Law

Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
Louis Jackson National Student Writing
Competition

Institute for Law and the Workplace

1-1-2011

A Critique of Supplying the NLRB with Social Science Expertise
Through Party/Amicus Briefs
Xenia Tashlitsky
University of California, Irvine School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/louis_jackson
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tashlitsky, Xenia, "A Critique of Supplying the NLRB with Social Science Expertise Through Party/Amicus
Briefs" (2011). Louis Jackson National Student Writing Competition. 12.
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/louis_jackson/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute for Law and the Workplace at Scholarly
Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louis Jackson National Student
Writing Competition by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For
more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

A CRITIQUE OF SUPPLYING THE NLRB WITH SOCIAL SCIENCE EXPERTISE
THROUGH PARTY/AMICUS BRIEFS
By Xenia Tashlitsky
I. INTRODUCTION
Established in 1935 to administer the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),1 the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) once employed a staff of economists to develop policy
analyses2 and a Board of nonpartisan government employees and academics to decide labor
disputes.3 By relying on both its Division of Economic Research (DER) and specialized external
sources for social science statistics, the early Board enriched its understanding of complex labor
questions, established a practice of considering diverse perspectives, and acknowledged the
importance of rigorously assessing the socioeconomic impact of labor policy.
Over the years, the agency’s ability to evaluate data has eroded drastically. At the height
of America’s anti-Communist hysteria, Congress eliminated a source of evidence by stopping the
NLRB from employing economic experts.4 Since the 1950s, presidents have politicized the
process of nominating Board members5 by appointing mostly attorneys with connections to labor
or management6 and virtually no social science skills.7 Accordingly, the NLRB now employs

1

NLRB, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 33 (1997).
Robin Stryker, Limits on Technocratization of the Law: The Elimination of the National Labor
Relations Board’s Division of Economic Research, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 341, 344 (1989).
3
Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 61 OHIO
ST. L. J. 1361, 1367 (2000).
4
29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2010) (stating that “Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
authorize the Board to appoint individuals…for economic analysis.”).
5
Flynn, supra note 3, at 1392.
6
Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems
with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L. J. 2013, 2019 (2009).
7
James A. Gross, Economics, Politics and the Law: The NLRB’s Division of Economic Research
1935-40, 55 CORNELL U. L. REV. 321, 347 (1970).
2
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neither economic nor social science experts,8 has no capacity to research labor realities,9 and
lacks independent access to social science studies.10
Instead, Board members receive most social science evidence from appellate-level
party/amicus briefs.11 Unlike other federal regulatory agencies, the Board creates policy by
deciding disputes, not writing regulations.12 Consequently, it must apply the data from briefs
toward assessing the policies in question.13 Without the expertise to evaluate data independently,
Board members could theoretically delegate the task of gathering and testing this data to the factfinding phase of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) proceeding, relying on parties to subject it
to rebuttal, counterevidence, and cross-examination.
However, the ALJ-level option is incompatible with Board members’ need for expensive
economic evidence. During NLRB decisions, ALJs behave like trial courts enforcing its
policies, while members behave like appellate courts evaluating its precedent. Once the parties
file appeals, the Board can choose to revisit the policies or merely to review their applications.14
Thus, when prosecuting multiple cases that involve similar issues, the General Counsel cannot
predict which case will become the vehicle for reexamining the regulations. Considering the

8

Stryker, supra note 2, at 344.
Fisk & Malamud, supra note 6, at 2065.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Myron Roomkin & Roger L. Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLRB Regulation: A
Proposal, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1441, 1462-63 n.89 (1977).
13
See Stryker, supra note 2, at 344. Indeed, it is unusual for an agency to establish policy on
complex social and economic issues without being able to generate and evaluate empirical
evidence on the needs for and effects of its activities. Thus, many federal regulatory agencies
have economic research divisions. These include the Department of Agriculture’s (DEA)
Economic Research Service (ERS), the Secretary of Commerce’s (SOC) Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), and the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and
Division of Economic and Labor Research (ELR).
14
See NLRB, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 35-36 (1997).
9
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cost of generating specialized evidence, the General Counsel lacks the resources to incorporate
statistics assessing the NLRB’s existing policy into every labor case.
Instead of relying on trials, the Board has bridged the gap by admitting appellate briefs as
social science evidence. Given the members’ special qualifications on thorny legal issues, most
analysts agree that “greater laxity may be permitted in a court which adjudicates both on the law
and on the fact,”15 allowing the Board to admit expert input without observing the formalistic
procedural requirements of rules of evidence, including the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE).16
In the “spirit of Daubert,”17 the Board can rely on evidence “of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,”18 even if the
evidence would be inadmissible in a federal court case under the FRE.19
Because the discretionary Daubert standard can raise the risk of arbitrariness or bias, it
increases the importance of assessing when/how the NLRB engages evidence. In Dana II, the
Board admitted four party briefs, 24 amicus briefs, and four reply briefs, but cited three sources
of social science statistics, all from within the NLRB;20 in Dana III, the Board admitted three
party briefs, 14 amicus briefs, and two reply briefs, but cited no social science statistics.21 While

15

2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 707 (4th ed. 2002).
Id. at 705.
17
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 265 (Supp. 2009). Pierce is referring
to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
18
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
19
Pierce, supra note 17, at 265.
20
Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007) (“Dana II”). For a list of links to all briefs in Dana II,
see NLRB, DANA/MELTADYNE BRIEFS,
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/foia/danametaldyne/danametaldyneamicusbriefs.html (last
visited Jan. 12, 2010) (discussed in detail in section IV infra). While the website lists 25 amicus
briefs, this appears to be an error because the Brief of International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO and Amicus American
Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations is listed twice.
21
Dana Corp., 2010 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 489 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 6, 2010) (“Dana III”). For a list of
links to all briefs in Dana III, see NLRB, INVITATIONS TO FILE BRIEFS,
16
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some imagine the NLRB encounters a “gaping hole” in relevant research,22 the
admission/citation imbalance may cast this conjecture into question.
Recognizing the disadvantages of relying on amici, certain scholars suggest that Congress
should authorize a social science unit that evokes the Board’s “early days.”23 However, the
NLRB is different from similar agencies that employ economists for specialized analysis. First,
Congress’s standard criteria for qualified Board members have evolved to limit the ability of
academics without industrial workplace experience to influence national policy. Second, the
Board’s adjudicatory body only requires economic research on specific appellate issues, not
general labor policy. Third, the Board receives a substantial quantity of expert evidence from
amicus briefs, not internal sources.
To recall the era of scientifically supported adjudications, Congress should refrain from
encouraging a panel of admittedly political appointees to exploit the research of ostensibly
apolitical authorities. Instead, Congress should accommodate the NLRB’s unique needs by
authorizing an economic research unit to generate policy analyses and appointing a crossdisciplinarily group to evaluate these analyses. By expanding the pool of Board members to
include lawyers and social scientists, Congress may succeed in cultivating a spirit of cooperation
across specializations while utilizing the members’ combined expertise in legal rights issues and
social science statistics.
II. THE NLRB’S RELIANCE ON AMICUS BRIEFS FOR EXPERT EVIDENCE
A. Evidentiary Rules for Administrative Agencies
http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/news_room/notice_for_briefs/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 12,
2010) (discussed in detail in section IV infra). Because the original employer withdrew its
request for review, the briefs are listed under Lamons Gasket Co.
22
Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, NLRB Elections vs. Card Check Campaigns: Results of a
Worker Survey, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 157, 160 (2009).
23
Roomkin & Abrams, supra note 12, at 1459-60 n.79.
4

Like courts, agencies receive argument and evidence from amici. Unlike courts, agencies
are not subject to the FRE. As a result, the rules of evidence for courts are complex and
technical, while the rules for agencies are simple and practical24: “Any oral or documentary
evidence may be received, but the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of
irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.”25 Acknowledging both systems, the
NLRB’s own rules only require the Board to obey the FRE “so far as practicable.”26
To justify this distinction, analysts observe that evidentiary rules for judicial trials are
designed with juries in mind. Accordingly, these evidentiary rules assume that triers of fact are
(1) separate from judges who adjudicate the issue of admissibility, (2) lacking in knowledge on
legal psychology or technical reliability, (3) susceptible to error in assessing probative value, (4)
inclined to emotionality, and (5) hence restrainable only by restricted exposure to prejudicial
evidence.27
By contrast, agencies try cases using panels of professionals, not juries of laypeople.28
(For example, the NLRB mostly employs labor lawyers.29) Considering their “specialized
expertise in the subject matter,” they do not share the aforementioned five characteristics of
juries: separation of responsibility, inexperience on topic, susceptibility to error, inclination
toward emotionality, and restraint through lack of exposure. Consequently, they are trusted to
examine the evidence without strong FRE safeguards against misuse.30

24

Pierce, supra note 15, at 705.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C § 556(d) (2010).
26
NLRB, RULES AND REGULATIONS § 102.39 (2010).
27
Pierce, supra note 15, at 706-07.
28
Id. at 706.
29
Fisk & Malamud, supra note 6, at 2019.
30
Pierce, supra note 15, at 706-07.
25
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Because an agency adjudicator “is equally exposed to evidence whether he admits it or
excludes it,” reviewing courts reason that rigorous exclusionary rules for agency proceedings
make little sense.31 Given the adjudicator’s presumptive competence to disregard or discount the
inadmissible or inapplicable, courts see little harm in letting agencies receive disputed evidence.
By contrast, they discern great danger in eliminating “that which is competent and relevant by
mechanistic application” of exclusionary rules.32
Accordingly, courts advocate a highly “critical view of exclusionary rulings by
administrative agencies”33 and admonish that exclusions “may well result” in due process
reversals.34 Simply put, they “strongly advise administrative law judges: if in doubt, let it in.”35
By effectively eliminating the procedural protections against admitting incompetent evidence,
these cases increase the importance of evaluating the evidence—without affording an alternative
for agencies that lack the requisite scientific expertise to resolve technical ambiguities.
B. The Daubert Standard for Evaluating Evidence
In Daubert, the Supreme Court suggested that FRE 703 (the only FRE relevant to
advising administrative agencies36) permits experts to rely on evidence “of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject,”37 even if the evidence would be inadmissible in a federal court case under the FRE.

31

U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp. Programs, 187 F.3d 384, 388 (4th Cir.
1999).
32
Multi-Medical Convalescent & Nursing Center v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 974, 977 (4th Cir. 1977).
33
Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945).
34
Multi-Medical, 550 F.2d at 977.
35
Id. at 978.
36
Pierce (2002), supra note 15, at 708.
37
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
6

Although Daubert is inapplicable directly to administrative decisions, the spirit of Daubert still
influences their approach.38
When analyzing the scientific validity of specialized evidence, the Supreme Court
admonishes trial courts to assess two factors: reliability and relevance.39 To do so, the Supreme
Court envisions a “flexible” inquiry40 and identifies five generally relevant issues: (1) Can (and
has) the theory or technique been tested? (2) Has it been subjected to peer review/publication?
(3) What is the known or potential error rate? (4) Does it have standards of operation? How are
they being maintained? and (5) Does it enjoy “general acceptance”?41
Applying these principles to current NLRB cases may pose two problems. First,
vigorous cross-examination and strong counterevidence “are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”42 However, evidence introduced in amicus
briefs is never subject to cross-examination. Additionally, briefs filed last or simultaneously are
unlikely to receive a response. As a result, amicus briefs can always avoid cross-examination
and often avoid rebuttal.
Additionally, the agency’s evidentiary inquiries must “focus…solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”43 However, the absence of expertise in
principles and methodology could raise an inference of relying on conclusions by process of
elimination. Indeed, NLRB adjudicators are often accused of switching sides in response to
shifting politics. As a result, some critics suspect the Board of creating conclusions first and
citing evidence afterward.
38

Pierce, supra note 15, at 707.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 593-94.
42
Id. at 596.
43
Id. at 595.
39
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Considering the complexity of the NLRA and the sophistication of the NLRB’s policy
problems, the Board has encountered an array of occasions for social science statistics.
However, without a social science staff, the NLRB often relies on agency experience, not
scientific evidence. When the Board does attempt to incorporate specialized input, it finds itself
“poorly equipped to evaluate it.”44 Recently, the NLRB has filled the gap by relying on data
from party/amicus briefs.
In relying on amici, the agency encounters two important critiques. Proponents of social
science scholarship are wary of basing NLRB decisions on “untested suppositions” about human
behavior.45 Using “the best available data,”46 they urge the Board to conduct empirical studies
and employ expert theory and research in order to assess the assumptions of cause and effect in
regulated labor processes.47 This way, the NLRB could determine the impact of potential
workplace policies,48 especially in areas that exceed the members’ own experiences.
Opponents of amici are skeptical of agency reliance on amicus briefs (or even party
briefs) that implicate factual issues. Because the Board usually solicits amicus briefs on appeal,
they possess the potential to derail a litigation. Because amicus briefs can introduce factual
information without obeying the rules of evidence or receiving vigorous cross-examination, the
NLRB cannot rely on parties’ adverse interests to keep them honest. Instead, it must evaluate
evidence independently—a challenge for lay Board members in hyper-technical cases.
III. DECISIONMAKING UNDER DER

44

Stryker, supra note 2, at 344.
JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 265 (1981).
46
Derek C. Bok, Forward to JULIUS G. GETMAN STEPHEN & B. GOLDBERG, UNION
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY, at xi, xii (1976).
47
Stryker, supra note 2, at 344.
48
Gross, supra note 7, at 347.
45
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To aid the Board in producing good policy, the early DER performed independent
research and wrote detailed reports that provided an economic/historical explanation for pressing
labor problems. The DER’s reports appeared in opinions from NLRB Board members and other
federal agencies, often without opposition.49 When parties did object to general DER statistics,
they argued the data was immaterial, unverified hearsay “of no evidentiary value.”50 Rejecting
this reasoning, the Board noted the well-settled “propriety of introducing in evidence economic
data…obtained from governmental or other authoritative sources.”51
For example, in NLRB v. Crowe Coal Co., the General Counsel charged a bituminous
coal company with discharging two employees for joining a union, thereby affecting interstate
commerce and violating NLRA § 8(1).52 When the company denied operating a business that
affected interstate commerce, the opinion cited a DER bulletin entitled The Effect of Labor
Relations in the Bituminous Coal Industry upon Interstate Commerce, which specifically stated
that “production is customarily not undertaken until orders are received and a supply of cars [for
interstate coal shipments is] assured.”53
Likewise, in H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, the General Counsel charged an employer that
reached a unionized workplace agreement but declined to sign a contract with refusing to bargain
in violation of NLRA §§ 8(1) and 8(5).54 To explain why failure to sign a contract necessarily
violated the duty to bargain and undercut the Act’s express aims, the opinion cited a DER
49

See, e.g., H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 517 (1941) (citation to DER by Board);
Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 547 (1937) (citation to DER by National
Mediation Board, which covers workplace disputes under 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Railway Labor Act)).
50
NLRB v. Crowe Coal Co., 104 F.2d 633, 634 (8th Cir. 1939).
51
Id. at 634 n.1 (citing Virginian, 300 U.S. at 547 n.4, 547 n.5; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 n. 8 (1937); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 267
n.2 (1938)).
52
Id. at 633.
53
Id. at 635-36 (citing Dep’t of Econ. Research, NLRB, BULL. NO. 2 (1938)).
54
Heinz, 311 U.S. at 517.
9

bulletin entitled Written Trade Agreements in Collective Bargaining, which itemized the growth
and extent of signed trade agreements and inferred they serve “both as recognition of the union
with which the agreement is reached and as a permanent memorial of its terms.”55
In addition to citing DER studies, the early Board enriched its analysis by supporting
substantive statements with non-DER sources. In Crowe, the opinion demonstrated the
respondent’s effect on interstate commerce with figures that showed the quantity of business it
conducted. To do so, it cited the parties’ agreed statement of facts, which described the
transactions for one representative year. The statement’s statistics showed, e.g., that 98,583.32
tons of respondent’s coal (or 36.8 percent of total production) had entered or maintained the
channels of interstate commerce that year alone.56
Similarly, the Heinz opinion illustrated the importance of written agreements to peaceful
workplaces with agency statistics and scholarly studies. Specifically, sources showed that (1) the
number of signed trade contracts had grown over time,57 (2) written contracts served as a
recognition of the union and a record of the terms,58 (3) employers often declined to sign written
contracts in order to frustrate the process of bargaining,59 and (4) unlike unilateral policies,

55

Id. at 524 (citing Dep’t of Econ. Research, NLRB, BULL NO. 4 (1939)).
Crowe, 104 F.2d at 635.
57
Heinz, 311 U.S. at 524 (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics, DEP’T OF LABOR, FIVE YEARS OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 5-7; Saposs and Gamm, Rapid Increase in Contracts, 4 LAB. REL.
REP. NO. 15, at 6).
58
Id. (citing LEWIS L. LORWIN, THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 309; COMMONS &
ASSOC., 2 HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 179-81, 423-24, 480; PERLMAN & TAFT, 4
HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932, at 9-10; PAUL MOONEY, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 13-14; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT 339).
59
Id. at 523-24 (citing SUMNER H. SLICHTER, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 110-20
(1935); R. R. R. BROOKS, WHEN LABOR ORGANIZES 224).
56
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signed labor contracts were considered “effective instrument[s] of stabilizing labor relations and
preventing, through collective bargaining, strikes and industrial strife.”60
By incorporating the DER’s rigorous labor policy research, the early NLRB set the
standard for enriching its understanding of complex labor questions with social science evidence.
For example, in Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation, the National Mediation Board
(NMB) borrowed a DER bulletin entitled Governmental Protection of Labor’s Right to Organize
to justify the Railway Labor Act.61 When other agencies adopted the DER’s economic data, they
implicitly acknowledged its unique expertise on contentious labor questions and lent an air of
legitimacy to other Board opinions. By contrast, when they stopped citing the NLRB’s
specialized evidence, they signaled its irrelevance on cutting-edge issues.62
Further, the early NLRB established a practice of considering non-DER perspectives with
strong scientific support. For example, the Board used data to show that employer interference
with employee unionization often induced labor unrest and impaired interstate commerce. In
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, it cited an 18-month Department of Labor (DOL) study
that blamed antiunion activities for 8/15 canning work stoppages affecting 7,484 employees.63
In Mooresville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, it cited another 18-month DOL study that blamed

60

Id. at 524 (citing CARROLL R. DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 936-37
(Rev. ed. 1938); MITCHELL, ORGANIZED LABOR 347; GEORGE G. GROAT, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICA 337-39, 341, 345, 346 (2d ed. 1926); 1935 NAT’L
MEDIATION BOARD ANN. REP. 1-2).
61
Virginian, 300 U.S. at 547 (citing Dep’t of Econ. Research, NLRB, BULL. NO. 1 (1936)).
62
In addition to Crowe, Heinz, and Virginian, I was unable to locate any other court cases that
cited the DER’s economic data. The DER was disbanded in 1940; the last case citing its data
was published in 1941.
63
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 462-63 (1938) (citing DEP’T OF LABOR,
STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN THE CANNING AND PRESERVING INDUSTRIES IN 1934, AND IN JANUARY
TO JULY, INCLUSIVE, 1935, BY MAJOR ISSUES INVOLVED, BOARD EXHIBIT NO. 16 (1935)).
11

antiunion activities for 94 textile work stoppages affecting 290,154 employees and costing the
industry 3,958,891 man-days of idleness.64
Additionally, the early NLRB engaged the evidence by scrutinizing whether statistics
actually supported the party briefs’ points. Occasionally, the Board repurposed one party’s
studies to support another party’s statements. For example, in NLRB v. National Motor Bearing
Co., the Board cited the defendant’s data on plant productivity to disprove its claims of declines
in production and suggest a proscribed motive for partially closing.65 Similarly, in Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. NLRB, the court cited a company’s data on seasonal hiring to show its unjustified
departure from standard practice and support the NLRB’s inference of antiunion animus for
failing to rehire.66
In 1939, however, a congressional committee confiscated the DER’s economic files and
branded the Board’s Chairman as subversive, the Chief Economist as Communist, and leftist
groups generally as anti-democratic, pro-Soviet, and un-American.67 In 1940, Congress
“unceremoniously” banned the NLRB from employing any economists.68 By attacking the
DER’s political ideology (not the unit’s scientific methodology), Congress implied that some
perspectives are simply forbidden, regardless of whether they receive scientific support.
Although the specific political attack that motivated this ban was discredited and faded from
America’s political culture, the ban itself persists in affecting NLRB processes.

64

Mooresville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 94 F.2d 61, 63 (4th Cir. 1938) (citing DEP’T OF LABOR,
STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN 1934, AND IN JANUARY TO JULY,
INCLUSIVE, 1935, BY MAJOR ISSUES INVOLVED, BOARD EXHIBIT NO. 16 (1935)).
65
NLRB v. National Motor Bearing Co., 105 F.2d 652, 657-58 (9th Cir. 1939).
66
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1939).
67
Stryker, supra note 2, at 350; 25.6 NLRB, RECORDS RELATING TO THE SMITH COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATION OF THE NLRB (1934-41).
68
Stryker, supra note 2, at 344; 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2010).
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Finally, the early NLRB acknowledged the importance of studying social science when
setting labor policy. Echoing the arguments that partisan appointees were probably partial to
specific sides and possibly prompted by future reemployment with certain interests,69 presidents
appointed nonpartisan government workers and scholars “nearly exclusively.”70 When
presidents accepted that career academics were uniquely qualified and inherently impartial, they
implied that social science expertise was integral to setting labor policy. However, when
presidents abandoned this nomination tradition, they intimated that social science expertise was
secondary to partisan industry experience—an important impediment to achieving legitimacy.
IV. DECISIONMAKING AFTER DER: AN NLRB CASE STUDY
A. Card Recognition Campaigns
The NLRB is currently confronting a great debate: whether the NLRA should protect a
union organizing process that excludes an official Board election. Traditionally, a union would
organize a workplace by collecting authorization cards. Once the NLRB had proof of cards from
one-third of eligible employees, it would hold a secret-ballot election. If the union won by
majority vote, the employer would have to recognize the union and engage in good-faith
bargaining. Additionally, the union would enjoy an unrebuttable presumption of majority
representation until the expiration of a reasonable waiting period.71
Today, a union that collects a majority of valid recognition cards typically demands
representative status without holding an election. Studies show that more employees will sign a
card than submit a secret-ballot vote in favor of unionization. Some unions state that cards best

69

Id. at 1370-71.
Id. at 1367.
71
Michael E. Aleo, Working Paper, Card Check Recognition: The Ongoing Legal and
Legislative Battle, BEPRESS LEGAL SERIES 957, 958-59 (2006),
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/957 (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
70
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reflect employee preference because employers will coerce their votes between the demand for
recognition and the holding of the election. Conversely, some employers state that elections best
reflect employee preference because unions will coerce their signatures during the campaign for
organization.72
Although the Board recognizes cards as bases for measuring employee support for
unionization, it expresses a preference for secret ballot elections.73 While some studies show that
employers opposing unions legally enjoy considerably more opportunities for persuading their
employees and commit poorly remedied unfair labor practices (UPLs) between demand and
election,74 other sources suggest that unions gathering cards take advantage of workers’ wishes
to “avoid offending the person who asks them to sign, often a fellow worker, or simply to get the
person off their back.”75 Further, employees who sign cards might simply change their minds.76
Thus, the current legal contest over whether or when a union should be able to receive
recognition with a card majority instead of an official election hinges on several empirical
questions, e.g., Are cards or elections more reliable indicators of employee preferences? How
prevalent is union misinformation or coercion in gathering cards? and How prevalent is
employer misinformation or coercion in persuading employees who signed cards to reject
unions?
B. The Recognition-Bar Challenge
Under the recognition-bar doctrine, a union that secures good-faith employer support on
basis of demonstrated majority status can receive a three-year reprieve from official Board
72

Id.
See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969).
74
Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1784 (1983).
75
NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360, 1371 (7th Cir. 1983).
76
Alliant Foodservice, 335 N.L.R.B. 695, 695 (2001).
73
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elections, regardless of challenges from employees and rival labor groups.77 During the
recognition-bar period, the Dana I plaintiffs claimed the acting union lacked the status of
majority bargaining representative and could not enter an agreement on behalf of Dana Corp.’s
employees. However, the ALJ simply applied the recognition-bar doctrine and upheld the
agreement.78
Generally, the ALJ is charged with enforcing agency policy, while the Board is capable
of evaluating its desirability.79 Accordingly, the Dana I ALJ dismissed the complaint in just ten
pages on the grounds that the General Counsel had pled improper prerecognition without proving
illegal recognition, a course of action not outlawed by the language of the NLRA.80 Despite the
quantity and complexity of issues that impact the recognition-bar discussion, the ALJ cited no
social science statistics and made no mention of whether the recognition-bar doctrine represented
sound policy.
On appeal, the reviewing Board reframed the issue from descriptive (whether the parties
had obeyed the recognition-bar doctrine) to normative (whether the doctrine should exist at all).
To answer the legal question of whether the recognition-bar doctrine is compatible with statute
and commendable as policy, it addressed the factual question of whether card-check elections are
somehow more susceptible to coercion and manipulation.81 As a result, the NLRB admitted four

77

Aleo, supra note 71, at 958-59.
Dana Corp., JD-24-05 (NLRB Div. of Judges Apr. 8, 2005) at 3 (“Dana I”).
79
See NLRB, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 33, 35-36 (1997).
80
Dana I, JD-24-05 at 3.
81
Dana II, 351 N.L.R.B. at 434.
78
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party briefs, 24 amicus briefs, and four reply briefs, many of which emphasized the social
science evidence and couched their challenges in data analysis terms.82
Using this evidence, the Board reconsidered the balance between two competing
interests: protecting employee preference and promoting stable bargaining. Next, it held the
recognition bar doctrine had undervalued the employees’ statutory right to choose their
representation through official NLRB elections. Finally, it modified the restrictions on
challenging the representativeness of voluntarily recognized unions.83
Three years later, the Board solicited amicus briefs regarding “the actual experience of
employees, unions, and employers under Dana Corp.”84 After reading the briefs, the NLRB
upheld the ALJ’s dismissal in Dana I, thereby reinstating the original recognition bar.85
Consequently, the Board members’ evaluation of party/amici evidence may ultimately have
influenced their approach to recognition-bar protection for union organizing efforts.
C. Dana II’s Amicus Evidence
1. Citations to Social Science Statistics
To answer the legal/normative question of whether card recognition campaigns should
receive NLRA protection, Dana II assessed the factual/empirical question of whether card
recognition campaigns are inherently less reliable than official NLRB elections.86 Despite
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admitting 24 amicus briefs that represented a variety of interests,87 the Board relied largely on
three NLRB sources: a former chairman,88 an operational summary,89 and an annual report.90
First, the Board cited a 1962 presentation by Frank McCulloch, who served as chairman
from 1961 to 197091—a source mentioned in “several” Dana II briefs 92 and other court
opinions.93 While Dana II failed to specify McCulloch’s strategy for obtaining the statistics he
cited, the speech’s transcript suggests that McCulloch had examined 202 elections: 58 with
recognition rates of 30-50 percent, 87 with 50-70 percent, and 57 with over 70 percent.94
The statistics showed a “significant disparity” between card recognition rates and official
election results: Unions with 50-70-percent recognition only won 48 percent of elections, and
unions with over-70-percent recognition only won 74 percent of elections.95 (For 50-70-percent
recognition, “[t]he study itself gives the figure 52 percent, but this is evidently an arithmetical
error, since the study reports that the union won 42 out of 87 elections, which is 48 percent.”96)
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Next, the Board cited two NLRB sources. In 2007, the General Counsel released an
operational summary memorandum for Fiscal Year 2006, which revealed that once the NLRB
received an election petition, the median delay was 39 days. In fact, 94.2 percent of elections
occurred within 56 days.97 The year before, the NLRB gave an annual report for Fiscal Year
2005, which only showed an objection rate of 5 percent.98
Finally, the Board cited an article by James Brudney, which surveyed several dozen
social science studies (and even a Dana II brief) on card recognition issues, many published
within the last ten years.99 However, it did not utilize Brudney’s article to communicate a labor
policy argument or convey an expert insight/evidence. Instead, it used Brudney simply to supply
a list of voluntary recognition objectives “that will remain unaffected by our decision today.”100
2. Use of Social Science Statistics
Surprisingly, neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion discussed whether
McCulloch’s statistics constituted good science. That is, neither opinion checked the study for
compliance with Daubert’s evidentiary benchmark for testing, peer review, error rate,
operational standards, and general acceptance. Instead, they confined their inquiry to
questioning its relevance to determining the significance of receiving card recognition.
Specifically, the majority argued that elections represent an instantaneous snapshot of
employee preference.101 However, recognition cards are regularly collected over protracted
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periods (e.g., over a year in one union drive), during which time “employees can and do change
their minds.”102 Because these cards merely provide a basis for conducting an election, the
reasons for questioning their reliability “become moot once an election is held.”103
By contrast, the dissent insisted the study had “prove[d] nothing” about whether cards or
elections are more reliable. This is because the disparity could “just as easily” have resulted
from employer coercion during election campaigns as union coercion during card collections.
Depending on who coerced whom, the cards (not the votes) may “truly [have] reflected the
employees’ free choice.”104
Similarly, the opinions never questioned the admissibility or reliability of internal NLRB
evidence and concentrated their arguments on examining its applications. Since 94.2 percent of
elections occur within three months of the filing of the election petition, the majority argued that
providing orderly processes for gauging electoral fairness may only cause a “substantial delay in
a small minority” of union drives.105 Since 95 percent of elections lack objections, the statistics
belie suggestions that antiunion employers enjoy “a one-sided advantage” which allows them to
exert pressure on employees throughout an election campaign.106
Without disputing the 94.2 percent figure, the dissent declared the delay unacceptable
because union status can remain unresolved for three months after voluntary recognition and
because objections may cause the delay to snowball.107 Likewise, without disputing the 5
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percent figure, the dissent maintained that “[t]o the extent the majority is suggesting that
employer coercion is rare in election campaigns, the majority’s statistics do not account for
situations in which employer conduct was not known to the union or in which the union, for
whatever reason, chose not to file objections.”108
Finally, the opinions never probed the Brudney survey article for admissibility or
relevance. Interestingly, Brudney argued that “an array of findings and studies indicate that the
NLRB elections regime regularly tolerates, encourages, and effectively promotes coercive
conditions that preclude the attainment of employee free choice,”109 which directly challenges
the majority preference for NLRB elections.110
Without scrutinizing these studies or engaging these arguments, the majority utilized
Brudney merely to supply the various reasons for voluntary recognition “that will remain
unaffected by our decision today.”111 By contrast, the dissent used the article to support a
substantive factual statement: that “employer antiunion conduct, and attendant delays, can
undermine union support during lengthy election campaigns.”112
D. Rite Aid’s Amicus Evidence
1. Citations to Social Science Statistics
In granting the request to review Dana II’s modification of recognition-bar protection,
Rite Aid refrained from reaching the merits or citing any statistics before “giving any interested
party any opportunity to present any evidence” on whether Dana II is working.113 Instead, it
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opted to solicit amicus briefs in order to “consider the actual experience of employees, unions,
and employers under Dana Corp., before arriving at any conclusions.”114
By contrast, the concurrence and dissent both cited the General Counsel’s statistics,
which showed an official election rate of 5 percent and a union rejection rate of 1 percent.
Specifically, the NLRB received some 1,111 notices of voluntary recognition and 54 petitions
for traditional election. The voting employees refused the union 15 times, a number that
included two elections that chose a petitioning union over the recognized union.115
2. Use of Social Science Evidence
Again, neither opinion disputed the General Counsel’s data as inadmissible or unreliable.
Instead, they disagreed on whether it showed that Dana II was doing its job. The concurrence
contended that since the rejection rate was just 1 percent, Dana II served no “clear purpose” in
99 percent of total cases.116 Further, the data had failed to capture the agreements never
consummated as a result of the parties’ concerns about Dana II. Finally, it had failed to address
Dana II’s impact on collective bargaining after voluntary recognition.117
The dissent responded that since the data reported at least 1,111 post-Dana II voluntary
recognition agreements (not including the ones with no posted notices), “[t]here has been no
apparent deterrent to voluntary recognition.”118 Accordingly, the Board had empirical evidence
that Dana II protected the employees’ preferences without discouraging either voluntary
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recognition or collective bargaining. By contrast, it lacked “a scintilla of objective evidence to
the contrary.”119
E. Dana III’s Amicus Evidence
In Rite Aid, the NLRB solicited briefs on Dana II issues from parties and amici. Despite
admitting three party briefs, 14 amicus briefs, and two reply briefs that represented a variety of
interests,120 neither opinion cited any social science statistics. Instead, they concentrated on
comparing and contrasting the Dana II issues to past precedent, particularly the prohibition on
pre-hiring agreements outside construction workplaces under Majestic Weaving Co., of New
York.121 In doing so, Board members reasoned “like lawyers balancing rights rather than policy
analysts studying social and economic regulatory problems.”122
F. Critique of Card Recognition Cases
1. Quality of Data
In the spirit of Daubert, agencies that evaluate specialized evidence should interrogate its
testing, peer review, error rate, operational standards, and general acceptance. 123 Because labor
conditions are “rapidly changing,”124 several legal scholars have updated McCulloch’s study
with more recent material (discussed in detail in section 2 infra). However, although his speech
119

Id. at *21 (Schaumber & Hayes, dissenting).
NLRB, INVITATIONS TO FILE BRIEFS,
http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/news_room/notice_for_briefs/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 12,
2010). The amici who oppose the recognition-bar doctrine are (1) chambers of commerce; (2)
employer industry associations; and (3) antiunion advocacy organizations. The amici who
support the recognition-bar doctrine are (1) congressmen; (2) companies; (3) unions; and (4)
professors. While Dana III lists different amici at *1, these entities responded to an earlier
request for party/amicus briefing, which occurred on March 30, 2006—a year before Dana II.
Accordingly, I analyze these entities under Dana II.
121
147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964).
122
Fisk & Malamud, supra note 6, at 2019.
123
Pierce, supra note 17, at 265.
124
Christopher P. Yost & John H. Fanning, The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act of 1988: Advance Notice Required? 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 675, 677 (1989).
120

22

was 45 years old at the time of the Dana II decision, neither the majority nor the dissent ever
raised issues regarding its reliability. Likewise, both opinions accepted the General Counsel’s
statistics without addressing this issue.
Initially, the absence of Daubert analysis might not appear unduly alarming. As a former
NLRB chairman, McCulloch lacked incentive to falsify his findings to favor either party. As a
federal labor office, the General Counsel had expertise on labor issues in general and NLRB
proceedings in particular. As “several” submitters cited the former chairman’s speech,125 it
probably enjoyed a general consensus of undisputed correctness. Consequently, analysts might
assert that Board members refrained from questioning its reliability simply because reliability
was not an issue.
However, critics should consider the studies’ two sources: the NLRB’s former chairman
and the NLRB’s General Counsel. Lacking internal expertise in social science techniques,126 the
Board must rely on briefs from parties to supply specialized data127—and likely also to evaluate
this data. Notwithstanding the data’s true quality, the uniquely symbiotic relationship between
the NLRB’s lawyer members as adjudicators, the NLRB’s General Counsel as researcher, and
the NLRB’s General Counsel as prosecutor may encourage the members to weigh their opinions
more heavily, letting older data from NLRB actors trump newer data from outside entities.128
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The Board is likeliest to encounter the issue of symbiosis when the beliefs of members
and researchers are aligned. That is, the Board is unlikely to complete a rigorous Daubert
analysis or conduct a resource-intensive review of specialized opposing arguments when the
adjudicators agree with the ideological implications of the information’s conclusions. However,
the parties and public would prefer the Board to articulate its reasons for accepting or rejecting
these arguments, especially when authors and adjudicators both serve a single agency and
support the same outcome.
The existence (or appearance) of undesirable incentives implicates two issues: reliability
and legitimacy. The assumption underlying the adversarial system is that clashes between
counterparties will expose the truth129—an assumption critical to adjudicators lacking the
technical knowledge to evaluate the evidence without input from parties. If the Board develops
patterns of weighing certain viewpoints more heavily, this may cause the quality of evidence to
decline, while leaving the Board ill-equipped to detect the defects.
Commentators also claim that courts mainly derive their legitimacy and authority from
persuading the public by justifying their decisions.130 As agency adjudicators are expressly
encouraged to admit most evidence,131 an observer’s inquiry will likely shift from admissibility
to reliability. In this context, the absence of analysis regarding the reliability of social science
statistics may leave the Board’s decisions unfounded, thus inviting an assumption of
political/ideological motivations.
2. Quantity of Data
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Although the Board members appeared to agree that McCulloch’s election statistics were
admissible and reliable, they disagreed on whether (and how) the statistics were relevant to
showing employee coercion by unions (or employers). In order to illuminate these issues, they
might have asked: (1) Fifty years later, does McCulloch’s data still reflect labor realities? (2)
How do employees receive information regarding unions? and (3) How do employees make
decisions on whom to support? Ignoring this invitation to incorporate specialized evidence, the
opinions cited almost no social science studies to prove substantive points.
To explain this omission, one may assert the existence of “gaping hole[s]” in empirical
comparisons between the pressure on employees by unions and employers.132 Since scientific
studies often require investments of time and money, the demand for data might exceed its
supply from independent research communities. Considering the NLRB’s express interest in
ascertaining “the actual experience of employees, unions, and employers”133 and analyzing
“what members of the labor management community…have to say about this data and its
lessons,”134 critics might contend the Board is citing the best information available.
However, Dana’s admission/citation imbalance calls the information hole argument into
question. In Dana II, the Board admitted four party briefs, 24 amicus briefs, and four reply
briefs. The briefs cited 39 different sources of social science statistics that appeared in academic
publications or agency reports in 2000-2010. These current citations featured in 3/4 (75 percent)
of the party briefs, 11/24 (46 percent) of the amicus briefs, and 1/4 (25 percent) of the reply
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briefs—a range of 0-12 and an average of 1.6 current citations per brief.135 Nevertheless, Dana
II utilized just three sources of social science statistics, all from within the NLRB.
Likewise, in Dana III, the Board admitted three party briefs, 14 amicus briefs, and two
reply briefs. The briefs cited 29 different sources of social science statistics that appeared in
academic publications or agency reports in 2000-2010. These figured in 1/3 (33 percent) of the
party briefs, 8/14 (57 percent) of the amicus briefs, and 1/2 (50 percent) of the reply briefs—a
range of 0-10 and an average of 1.8 current citations per brief.136 However, despite the Board’s
stated interest in “the actual experience of employees, unions, and employers,”137 Dana III used
no social science statistics at all.
To explain this absence, critics should consider the shortage of rebuttal for social science
statistics from party/amicus briefs. In Dana II, just five138 current sources appeared in multiple
entities’ briefs, only three139 of them in briefs that took opposite sides on recognition-bar issues.
In Dana III, just seven140 appeared in multiple briefs, only two141 of them opposing. Given the
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overlap between the sources cited in the Dana II briefs and the Dana III briefs, the combined
Dana briefing only contributed four142 different current sources that even potentially received an
opponent’s rebuttal. This increased the difficulty of evaluating them critically.
By reducing its citations to social science statistics, the Board might hope to prevent lay
members who lack a background in social science scholarship from inadvertently placing
authority in pseudoscience. However, this practice also prevents the Board from accumulating
experience/expertise in analyzing this type of information. Further, it permits a somewhat dated
study to frame the discussion and dominate the debate, rather than sparking a dialogue that uses
the knowledge of the past and the present. As a result, the Board runs the risk of rendering data
irrelevant to reaching its decisions, thus raising an inference of arbitrariness or incompetence.
V. PROPOSAL
Since the amendment which prohibits the NLRB from employing any economists
arguably permits the employment of general social scientists,143 some scholars suggest the
agency should hire a social science unit to evaluate party evidence and initiate independent
investigations.144 However, the NLRB is different from similar agencies that employ economists
for scientific analysis. Accordingly, Congress should accommodate the NLRB’s unique needs

Organizing, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, EPI Briefing Paper No. 235 (2009); Cohen, supra
note 141; Joel Dillard & Jennifer Dillard, Fetishing The Electoral Process: The National Labor
Relations Board’s Problematic Embrace of Electoral Formalism, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST.
819 (2008); Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 138; Fisk & Malamud, supra note 6; Manheim, supra
note 139; New Survey Says Union Members Prefer Secret-Ballot Elections Over Card Check,
DAILY LAB. REP., July 22, 2004.
141
Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 138; Fisk & Malamud, supra note 6.
142
Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 138; Fisk & Malamud, supra note 6; Hartley, supra note 140;
Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB, SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS (FISCAL YEAR 2003) (2003).
143
29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2010) (stating that “Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
authorize the Board to appoint individuals…for economic analysis.”).
144
Roomkin & Abrams, supra note 12, at 1459.
27

by authorizing an economic research unit to produce scientific evidence and appointing a crossdisciplinarily group to evaluate this evidence.
First, Congress’s standard criteria for qualified NLRB members have evolved to limit
the ability of academics without industrial workplace experience to influence national policy.
When Eisenhower expanded the NLRB’s membership to include political appointees, supporters
suggested that partisans possessed (1) an expertise in real-world labor relations, (2) the integrity
to resist interest capture, and (3) the ability to follow federal judges in wearing “two hats.”145
They also alleged the impossibility of finding “anyone…entirely free” from allegedly prejudicial
experiences.146
However, when Nixon nominated a career management lawyer named Edward B. Miller,
the congressional debates heralded an entirely new approach to measuring Board members’
qualifications. Supporting his candidacy, some Congress members refined and amplified the
Eisenhower-era arguments to turn the issue of background completely around. Since privatesector experience yields practical expertise, Miller’s management background was not a minus,
but a plus. Instead, Congress’s true concern was NLRB’s overwhelming inclusion of appointees
from government and academia.147
The Miller nomination marked a turning point in perceived acceptability of partisan
appointments. By reacting to anti-partisan arguments with profound indifference (not one
senator voted “no”), Congress exhibited “complete acquiescence to the appointment of
management partisans to the Labor Board.”148 Accordingly, Congress also implicitly
acknowledged the concerns over permitting government employees and academics who lacked
145
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industry experience to influence labor policy. With the exception of Carter, the succeeding
presidents continued this practice.149
In sum, Congress is concerned that the Board “has had a deficiency by not having anyone
on it who has had direct practical experience in the field.”150 Such legislative rhetoric reflects
several unflattering assumptions about staff member academics. Specifically, it suggests that
professional researchers lack the industrial workplace expertise to understand their theories’
actual effects. By contrast, political appointees possess the practical life experience to temper
academics’ impact on national labor policy. This establishes an inherently adversarial
relationship between the contributions of the academics and the competency of the agency.
If Congress were to reauthorize the DER, the tension between the lawyers on the Board
and the social scientists employed by it could undermine its ability to use this evidence
effectively. Assuming Congresses attempts to ensure the reconstituted DER’s independence by
rendering it separate from the NLRB’s appellate Board (much like the NLRB’s General
Counsel), it might hamper the economic unit’s integration into existing Board processes by
making it all too easy for members to ignore its evidence and analyses.
By contrast, if Congress augments the Board’s membership with professional academics,
they may develop a dialogue between lawyers and researchers and foster mutual assistance
between law and science. At minimum, the Board members trained in social science would be
able to write majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions assessing the Board’s evidentiary
engagement, thereby forcing the Board members trained in law to address the specialized
evidence submitted.
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Further, since current Board members serve a five-year term before rejoining the ranks of
attorneys for corporations and unions, their labor industry roots could influence their ideologies
(either because the interests of employability might affect their opinions or because their sidespecific ties might indicate their preexisting labor philosophies). Accordingly, some argue that
“because of their bias, neither the Board as an institution nor the public will really reap the
benefit of the great practical expertise that union and management-side lawyers turned Board
members bring to the job…[because] their partisan ties will trump their expertise every time.”151
Assuming this argument has merit, the members’ partisan ties could equally well trump
the unit’s economic research. While Congress is unlikely to find a perfectly impartial nominee,
it may locate a professional researcher lacking a connection to unions or corporations. Further,
unlike an attorney Board member, a scholarly Board member who evaluates technical evidence
must adhere to scientific community standards. Accordingly, his presence may counteract the
politicization of controversial labor questions by encouraging the NLRB to engage the facts.
Through persuading his colleagues to engage party evidence, a scholarly Board member
could promote the spirit of Daubert and push a thorough, rigorous approach to justifying
technical decisions. Indeed, since the original DER existed a decade before Congress began
appointing any partisan Board members, a proposal to evoke the Board’s early days should
encompass both elements of early NLRB adjudications: nonpartisan researchers and nonpartisan
decisionmakers.
Second, the NLRB’s research needs are narrow in scope. For example, since the
Department of Labor (DOL) is charged with promulgating labor regulations, its Division of
Economic and Labor Research (ELR) offers advice regarding the relevance, application, and
151
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interpretation of current economic research to international economic policy. Further, it fills
DOL requests for research results and economic analyses to facilitate the formulation of
international economic policies and programs.152 By contrast, the Board’s adjudicatory body
only requires economic research on specific issues relevant to unions and collective bargaining
processes, not general labor policy.
Given the NLRB’s narrow interests, opponents of employing interagency economists
may argue that the DER’s exploratory research is incompatible with the NLRB’s adjudicatory
function. Without a background in law, academics might expand their inquiries into questions
not raised by real-world litigants, who may prefer to leave these issues to legislatures or resolve
them independently. If NLRB adjudicators included a mix of lawyers and scholars, the agency
could utilize the attorneys’ unique expertise in limiting the deliberations to legally relevant
issues.
To maximize these benefits of interdisciplinarity, the NLRB should change its
composition to include three labor lawyers and two social scientists. (Ideally, the Board would
implement this proposal upon reaching its quorum of five acting members.) In setting the
number of scientists at 2/5, the NLRB could include sufficient experts to permit a debate, thus
preventing one person from becoming the arbiter of real scientific truth. Simultaneously, it could
maintain the Board’s lawyer majority, thus reflecting its role of adjudicating legal disputes.
Third, the Board receives a substantial quantity of scientific evidence from amicus briefs.
However, while staffed exclusively by lawyers, the Board is ill-prepared to evaluate its
quality.153 Consequently, “the only kind of expertise [the Board] possesses [is] the logical
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coherence of doctrine and an intuitive sense about whether particular rules generate productive
or unproductive litigation.”154 This “type of expertise…is quite different from what generally
counts as administrative agency expertise:” i.e., expertise in the subject of the adjudication.155
Considering these characteristics of modern Board members, a social science staff could
enhance the NLRB by filling the expert evaluator void. If Congress did nothing other than
reauthorize the DER, it would create the problem of a single party serving as both a source and
an evaluator and confer this party an advantage over external sources, only partially addressing
the agency’s structural issues. By contrast, if Congress also expanded the Board to include
social scientists, it would ensure that separate groups generate and evaluate specialized evidence.
On one hand, a dominant interagency DER might reap the benefits of economies of scale,
allowing its economists to afford larger, more expensive research. On the other, it may reduce
competition for Board citations, thus undermining accountability and encouraging complacency.
By separating the generators and evaluators of information, the NLRB could establish an
incentive for employees and amici to submit their very best research, thus increasing the
agency’s scientific relevance and improving its impartiality and legitimacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
In defending agencies’ exemption from strict FRE standards for evaluating expert
evidence, scholars suggest that agency ALJs have (1) extensive experience and specialized
expertise in specific subjects, and (2) political accountability for policy choices regarding certain
industries. Although the current NLRB lacks a staff of social science experts, the Board still
requires specialized expertise to formulate labor policies that addresses real-world problems.156
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To bridge this gap, the Dana Boards admitted numerous briefs with social science statistics, but
cited very few of them. The pool of perspectives necessarily impacted the Board’s data quality
and quantity, and thus its deliberations and decisions.
Scholars have faulted the NLRB for its ignorance about the impact of its decisions, its
isolation from the policymaking in other areas of the law of the workplace (including the
policymaking of the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC)), and “the tendency of Board members, who recently have been drawn
almost entirely from the ranks of labor and management attorneys, to reason like lawyers
balancing rights rather than policy analysts studying social and economic regulatory
problems.”157 Although many agree the NLRB’s recent approach to evaluating scientific
evidence is less than perfect, they disagree on what the problems are—and how to fix them.
Accordingly, some state the NLRB should minimize its use of social science to honor
Congress’s intent in excluding economist employees while upholding superior interests, such as
legal realism and stare decisis. Others suggest the NLRB should maximize its use of social
science beyond simply employing social scientists. Finally, some argue the NLRB should
expand its role to encompass both adjudication and rulemaking, thereby reducing its dependence
on amicus briefs altogether.
To support the role of science, I argue that bringing experts aboard will enrich the
analysis by offering an alternative to reasoning like lawyers. However, assuming the NLRB then
becomes more qualified to analyze specialized evidence, it does not need to give this evidence
dispositive weight. If the expert analysis clashes with popular labor policy or existing market
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reality (for example, the interest in maintaining stable rules), the Board could exercise its
discretion to minimize its impact.
To support the limits on economic experts, I argue the NLRB is entrusted with balancing
competing interests. Accordingly, the Board should create a culture that incorporates specialized
evidence without marginalizing alternative outlooks, such as law and politics. By developing a
reputation for justifying its decisions in rational, empirical terms, the Board will increase its
relevance and pave the way for expanding into new policymaking avenues—perhaps even
rulemaking.
When proposing novel solutions to pervasive social problems, some scholars suggest that
since the smaller government entities are more abundant, more adaptable, and less likely to
radically affect a large constituency, such “laboratories of democracy” 158 serve as ideal test
subjects. Thus, investigating a proposal for improving the NLRB’s evidentiary policy could
inspire a more universal debate about whether amicus briefs are sufficient for courts to fill the
social science gap without sacrificing relevance/reliability. Ultimately, exploring these issues
could expand our ability to fashion a mutually beneficial relationship between law and science.
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